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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over the pleadings pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Standard of Review. 
This is an appeal from summary judgment in favor of Defendant Farmers Insurance 
Exchange ("Farmers"). "To determine whether the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, affording those legal 
conclusions no deference." In "reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." 
Ault v, Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 787 (Utah 2002). 
B. Preservation of Issues in the Trial Court. 
The following issues were preserved for review by Farmers summary judgment in the 
trial court: (1) did the trial court correctly determine the "regular use" exclusion is not 
ambiguous; and (2) did the trial court correctly determine that the "regular use" exclusion bars 
coverage. 
Valentine's argument that underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage follows the individual 
and, therefore, coverage applies regardless of the vehicle being driven is being raised for the first 
time on appeal.1 
The court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it 
is one not relied on below." Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
Defendants submit that U.C.A. §§31A-22-302 and 31A-22-305 are determinative of the 
issues in this case. (See Addendum for full text.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court. 
This action arises out of Plaintiff Nicole Valentine's ("Valentine") claim for underinsured 
motorist (UIM) benefits for injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred on 
December 6, 2000. After receiving the policy limits from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier, 
Valentine made a demand for UIM benefits under her parents' policy with Farmers Insurance 
Exchange ("Farmers"). 
After investigating the claim, Farmers denied coverage based on the "regular use" 
exclusion in the UIM provision of the policy. On January 8, 2003, Valentine wrongfully filed a 
Complaint captioned in the Fourth Judicial District Court in the Third Judicial District Court 
alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (R. 12.) Valentine also filed a First Amended 
Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court on April 4, 2003. (R. 21.) Realizing that the 
matter was improperly filed in the Third Judicial District Court, Valentine filed a Motion for 
Change of Venue on April 10, 2003 (R. 22), and the accompanying Memorandum in Support on 
2 
April 11, 2003 (R.25.) By a June 3, 2003 Order granting Valentine's Motion for Change of 
Venue, the matter was transferred to the Fourth Judicial District Court (R. 32.) 
On July 10, 2003, Farmers answered Valentine's First Amended Complaint and filed a 
Cross-Claim for Declaratory Relief (R. 72.) The Cross-Claim for Declaratory Relief requested 
the court determine that the "regular use" exclusion applied to bar coverage for Valentine's claim 
for UIM benefits. 
On July 15, 2004, Farmers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 113) and 
Memorandum in Support (R. 155) requesting the court find that the "regular use" exclusion 
applied to bar coverage for the UIM benefits being claimed by Valentine. In addition, Farmers 
argued that the "regular use" exclusion did not violate public policy. 
Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on September 10,2004, with the 
court determining that the "regular use" exclusion was not ambiguous and that it precluded 
coverage for UIM benefits. (R. 207.) On November 29, 2004, the case was transferred to the 
American Fork Department. (R. 209.) On January 13, 2005, the Order granting summary 
judgment was entered in favor of Farmers, finding that the "regular use" exclusion was not 
ambiguous and barred coverage for UIM benefits. (R. 214.) 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on February 11, 2005. (R.217.) On March 22, 2005, 
Valentine's deposition was made part of the record. (R. 224.) 
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B. Statement of Facts 
In October of 2000, Nicole Valentine began working for Frank Edwards Company as a 
parts runner. She was there approximately 2 months when the accident happened. (R. 224, N. 
Valentine Depo: 11:16-25; 12:1-11; 15:18-25.) 
On December 6,2000, Plaintiff Nicole Valentine was involved in a motor vehicle 
accident while working as a parts delivery driver for Frank Edwards Company (Parts Plus). At 
the time, she was driving a Chevy pick-up truck provided by Frank Edwards Company. (R. 224, 
N. Valentine Depo: 12:1-8; 19:25; 26:19-25; 27:1-6; 28:10-22; 87:6-9.) 
During regular business hours, the keys to the vehicle were left in the ignition of the truck 
to allow employees to get in and out quickly to do their deliveries. At the end of the day, the 
vehicle was locked and the keys were placed in a basket in the office. In the morning, Ms. 
Valentine would pick up the keys from this basket and proceed with her day's tasks. (R. 224, N. 
Valentine Depo: 27:7-15; 39:22-25; 40:1-13.) 
Nicole Valentine drove the Chevy pick-up truck most of the time. When she was not 
driving this particular truck, she drove one of three others that were owned by Frank Edwards 
Company and used to deliver parts. Gas for the vehicle was paid with a Frank Edwards credit 
card. (R. 224, N. Valentine Depo: 27:16-25; 28:1-4; 41:10-13.) 
Valentine would drive her personal vehicle to travel to and from work. She would leave 
her personal vehicle in the parking lot for her entire shift, except when she used it for a half an 
hour during lunch. She would only use this particular truck unless her employer took it on his 
4 
lunch hour or if there was a problem with the truck, then she would use another Frank Edwards 
vehicle. (R. 224, N. Valentine Depo: 27:16-25; 28:1-17; 29:1-16.) 
Valentine worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and was paid every other week. Each 
morning, she would clock in, pull the parts and load them in the back of the pick-up truck to do 
her deliveries. (R. 224, Valentine Depo: 31:1-10; 32:13-20; 34:20-22.) 
On December 6, 2000, the day of the accident, she was at the end of her shift and was 
making her last delivery. She was in tlje Chevy pick-up assigned by the company, heading south 
on State Street, delivering a part to Tunex in Provo. She acknowledged she was driving the 
Chevy pick-up which was furnished for her "use on the job" when she was involved in a rear-end 
collision. (R. 224, N. Valentine Depo: 41:23-25; 42:1-25; 43:1-25; 44:1-22; 45:14-25; 46:1-9; 
91:21-25; 92:1-7.) 
After the accident, she drove the vehicle back to Frank Edwards and drove her personal 
vehicle home. At the time of the accident, Valentine was residing with her parents. (R. 224, N. 
Valentine Depo: 25:24-25; 26:1-10; 53:23-25; 54:22-23.) 
As a result of this accident, Valentine settled with the tortfeasor and filed a claim for 
Workers Compensation Benefits. She is now making a claim for UIM benefits under her 
parents' policy with Farmers. It is undisputed that she was an insured under this policy. (R. 19, 
20.) 
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Farmers denied coverage based on the "regular use" exclusion. Specifically, that the 
vehicle being driven by Valentine in the course and scope of her employment was not an insured 
vehicle under the policy because it was not described in the declarations and was provided for her 
"regular use" on the job. As such, there is no coverage. (R. 60, 70.) 
RELEVANT POLICY PROVISIONS 
DEFINITIONS 
Your insured car means: 
1. The vehicle described in the Declarations of this policy or 
any private passenger car or utility car with which you 
replace it. You must advise us within 30 days of any 
change of private passenger car or utility car. If your 
policy term ends more than 30 days after the change, you 
can advise us anytime before the end of that term. 
2. Any additional private passenger car or utility car you acquire 
ownership of during the policy period, provided that: 
a. You request that we insure it within 30 days of the acquisition, 
and 
b. As of the date of the acquisition, all private passenger cars and 
utility cars you own are insured with a member company of the 
Farmers Insurance Group of Companies. 
Ownership will include the written leasing of a private passenger or 
utility car for a continuous period of at least six months. 
5. Any other private passenger car, utility car or utility trailer not 
owned by or furnished or available for regular use by vou or a family 
member. This includes such vehicles while rented by you on a daily 
or weekly basis. But no vehicle will be considered as your insured 
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car unless there is a sufficient reason to believe that the use is with 
permission of the owner, and unless it is used by you or a family 
member. (Emphasis added.) 
PART I - LIABILITY 
Exclusions 
12. Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of any vehicle other than your insured car, which 
is owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or a 
family member. 
PART II - UNINSURED MOTORIST AND UNDERINSURED 
MOTORIST COVERAGE 
Coverage C-l Underinsured Motorist Coverage 
Subject to the Limits of Liability we will pay all sums which an insured 
person is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or 
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury 
sustained by the insured person while occupying your insured car. 
If other than your insured car, underinsured motorist coverage applies 
only if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle 
covered under the terms of this policy. 
Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only 
3. Underinsured motor vehicle means a land motor vehicle when: 
1. The ownership, maintenance or use is insured or bonded for bodily 
injury liability at the time of the occurrences; and 
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2. Its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the amount 
of the insured person's damages. 
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle: 
(b) furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family 
member,... (Emphasis added.) 
Other Insurance 
However, in no event will the limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage 
for two or more motor vehicles be added together or stacked to determine the 
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. 
ENDORSEMENT ADDING REGULAR AND FREQUENT USE 
EXCLUSION TO PART II 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage (and Underinsured Motorist Coverage if 
applicable) does not apply to damages arising out the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of any vehicle other than your insured car . . . which 
is owned by or furnished or available for the regular use by you or a 
family member. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 39, 47-48, 50). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Case law interpreting the "regular use" exclusion applies to both liability and UEM 
coverage. This is because the liability and UIM sections have the same "regular use" exclusion, 
thus "the same classes of people are provided coverage under both provisions to the same 
extent." Cruz v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 12 P.3d 307, 312 (Colo. App. 2000). 
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Case law from other jurisdictions has found that this "regular use" exclusion is not 
ambiguous. Utah has not specifically addressed this issue, but in Mann v. Preferred Risk Mut. 
Ins. Co., 382 P.2d 884 (Utah 1963), the "regular use" exclusion was applied to bar coverage. As 
such, it is reasonable to assume that the court found the phrase "regular use" was not ambiguous. 
(See also Hill v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 888 P.2d 138, 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1994.) 
The court correctly ruled that the "regular use" exclusion applied, finding that Valentine 
was not entitled to UIM benefits. This position is supported by the case law cited and relied 
upon by Farmers. 
Case law, the policy and statutory language supports Farmers' position that UIM 
coverage follows the vehicle, not the individual. This is to ensure that the risk assumed is 
commensurate with the premiums paid. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
"REGULAR USE" EXCLUSION IS NOT AMBIGUOUS 
Farmers is addressing Valentine's arguments advanced in her sections entitled "The 
Regular Use Clause," "Some Interpretations of the Meaning of 'Regular Use,'" "The Phrase is 
Ambiguous," and "Alternate Views: the Phrase is NOT Ambiguous." Utah case law supports 
that this phrase is not ambiguous. Mann v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., supra, and Hill v. 
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Farmers Ins, Exch., supra. Further, the Farmers policy language follows that of the UIM statute. 
Therefore, Valentine's attempts to establish an ambiguity are without merit. 
A. The Term " Regular Use" Is Not Ambiguous 
Two Utah cases, Mann v. Preferred Risk Mut, Ins, Co,, supra, and Hill v. Farmers Ins, 
Exch., supra, address the "regular use" exclusion. Neither case specifically addresses whether 
the exclusion is ambiguous, but the court in both cases made a determination that there was no 
coverage based on this exclusion. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the court found that 
the "regular use" exclusion was not ambiguous. 
This position is supported by case law from other jurisdictions as well. When faced with 
interpreting the phrase "regular use," the courts noted: 
The words are not unusual and their meaning is well known in common parlance. 
It is not a matter of ambiguity that causes courts to struggle with this phrase. 
Courts struggle with its application because each case must be decided upon its 
own facts and circumstances, and therefore, its application is a struggle. Its 
meaning is not. Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, 681 P.2d 15, 20 (Kan. 
1984) (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the phrase is not ambiguous; rather, it is the application which "depends upon the 
facts of a particular case" that is problematic. Bringle v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 169 N.W.2d 
879, 883 (Iowa 1969). See also Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra; International Service Ins. 
Co. v. Walther, 463 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Kenney v. Employers' Liability 
Assur. Corp., 214 N.E.2d 219, 221 (Ohio 1966); Vern v. Merchants Mut. Casualty Co., 118 
N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (N.Y. 1952); Grange Ins. Ass'n v. MacKenzie, 694 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Wash. 
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1985); Eddy v. Fidelity and Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 116 P.2d 966, 969 (Wash. 1989); 
Abbott v. General Accident Group, 693 P.2d 130,133 (Wash. App. 1985); O'Brien v. Halifax 
Ins. Co. of Mass., 141 So.2d 307, 308 (Fla. App. 1 Dist 1962). Unlike cases from other 
jurisdictions, the application of the facts in this case is not difficult and clearly establishes that 
the "regular use" exclusion applies to bar coverage. 
B. Valentine Cannot Establish an Ambiguity 
1. An Alternate Interpretation of the Phrase Does Not Create an Ambiguity. 
Valentine, to support her position, selects cases which interpret the phrase "regular use" 
differently. However, Utah case law supports and Valentine fails to recognize that "[t]he 
language of a contract is not necessarily ambiguous merely because a party urges a different 
meaning that is more in accordance with its own interests." Larsen v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 
818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Ut. App. 1991). 
For example, the "unfettered ability to regularly use a vehicle according to his/her whims, 
needs or desires," American States Ins. Co. v. Tanner, 563 S.E.2d 825, 833 (W. Va. 2002); 
"expressed or implied understanding with the owner of an automobile that the insured could have 
the use of the particular automobile or perhaps any automobile of the other at such times as he 
desired if available," George B. Wallace Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 349 P.2d 789, 792 
(Or. 1960); the "continuous use; uninterrupted normal use for all purposes; without limitations as 
to use; and customary use as opposed to occasional use or special use," Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
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Hudson, 488 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Ariz. App. 1971); Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, Id. 20; 
and the "steady uninterrupted use for all purposes and without limitation," Columbia Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 905 P.2d 474, 478 (Alaska 1995), are interpretations of the 
phrase advanced by different courts. Yet, these courts did not find the phrase "regular use" to be 
ambiguous. As such, an ambiguity cannot be created by merely showing that various courts 
interpreted the phrase differently. Thus, Valentine's argument is without merit. 
2. None of the Cases Valentine Relied Upon to Show Ambiguity are Applicable. 
Valentine also relies on case law to support her position that this phrase, "regular use," is 
ambiguous. Tillotson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 637 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Ark. 1982); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 334 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio App. 1974); Ricci v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., 290 A.2d 408 (R.I. 1972); and Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Ward, 517 P.2d 966, 969 (Wash. 1984). 
These cases are, however, all factually distinguishable. 
In Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra, a distinction was made between the 
"regular use" language in a family automobile policy versus a garage policy, and is not applicable 
to the facts of this case. Similarly, in Ricci v. US. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, the court was 
of the opinion that it was the application of the term, rather than the term itself, that was 
problematic. Specifically, the court determined that since the car was not made available to the 
plaintiff most of the time, it would be deemed sporadic and occasional use and, as such, was not 
an automobile "furnished for the regular use of the plaintiff." Id. 415. Dairy land Ins. Co. v. 
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Ward, supra, involved whether the insured had notice of the existence of the "regular use" 
exclusion. 
Tillotson v. Farmers Ins. Co., supra, is the only case cited by Plaintiff that found the 
language ambiguous but, again, the court seemed to focus on the application to the facts. This 
position is supported by General Agents Ins. Co. of America v. People Bank & Trust Co., 854 
S.W.2d 368, 369 (Ark. App. 199) and Green v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 57 F. Supp.2d 729 (W.D. 
Ark. 1999), wherein the court did not focus on whether the language was ambiguous, but on the 
application to the facts in rendering its decision. 
3. Use of the Prepositions "the " and "by " Do Not Create an Ambiguity. 
Lastly, Valentine attempts to create an ambiguity by looking at various prepositions and 
articles and concluding that these make the phrase "furnished for the regular use" ambiguous. 
Specifically, Valentine focuses on the word "the" in the phrase "available for the regular use by 
you or a family member." Valentine additionally argued that the preposition "by" rather than 
"o f after "owned by or furnished or available for the regular use," also creates an ambiguity. 
Again, this is not supported by any case law. Specifically, with regard to the word "the," 
Valentine attempts to argue that this "cross[es] the line into legal ambiguity." However, the 
word "the" in that location does not change the meaning of the phrase in any way. More to the 
point, Plaintiff does not cite any case law to support this proposition. 
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With respect to this claim that "by" rather than "of after "owned by or furnished or 
available for the regular use" creates an ambiguity, is not supported by Cruz v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, supra, cited by Valentine. Rather, the Colorado Court held that this was an 
unreasonable interpretation because "by" modified "regular use." Accordingly, Farmer's use of 
the words "the" and "by" in the "regular use" exclusion do not make the provision ambiguous. 
As such, Valentine's argument is without merit. 
POINT II 
THE REGULAR USE EXCLUSION APPLIES TO BAR COVERAGE 
The court correctly held that the "regular use" exclusion applies and that Valentine is not 
entitled to UIM benefits. Valentine never addresses this. She never distinguishes the cases cited 
by Farmers applying the "regular use" exclusion but instead, without citing any case law in 
support, argues that the cases relied upon by Farmers interpreting the "regular use" exclusion 
involve liability coverage, not UIM coverage, and are therefore inapplicable to the present case. 
However, because the liability and UIM provisions have the same "regular use" exclusion, 
suggests the "same classes of people are provided coverage under both provisions to the same 
extent." Cruz v. Farmers*Ins. Exchange, Id. 312. As such, the case law interpreting this 
exclusion applies to both liability and UIM cases. Given that the purpose of the "regular use" 
exclusion is the same, that is to prevent the insured from insuring one vehicle with the 
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expectation of coverage on all vehicles without considering the risk and paying a corresponding 
premium, indicates there is no distinction between cases that involve liability vs. UIM coverage. 
Valentine's reference to U.C.A. §31A-22-305(10)(a), as amended in 2003, was not in 
effect at the time of this loss, is not retroactive and, therefore, is not relevant. She refers to this 
amendment to show that the phrase "regular use" has been deleted and, as such, the exclusion 
should not apply. 
In support of its position that the "regular use" exclusion bars UIM coverage for 
Valentine, Farmers refers to case law addressing three categories under which the "regular use" 
exclusion bars coverage. The first category are cases where it was argued that the term "regular 
use" includes both business and personal use; the second category are cases where the party took 
an incidental side trip and argued that it invalidated the "regular use" exclusion and; the third 
category are cases where the party did not always drive the assigned vehicle. In all of those 
situations and circumstances, the courts have found that the "regular use" exclusion was not 
ambiguous and did bar coverage. 
A. "Regular Use" Does Not Require Both Business and Personal Use 
There are jurisdictions where it has been argued that "regular use" means the vehicle is 
used both for business and personal use. In other words, the position taken is if the vehicle is 
only used for one purpose, i.e. business use and not personal use, then it is not excluded by the 
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"regular use" provision. However, that position is the minority and the better reasoned approach 
supports a finding that both business and personal use is not required. 
In Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, the plaintiff was a police officer driving a 
vehicle that was assigned to him for his "regular use" when he was involved in an automobile 
accident. As a result of that accident, he sustained injuries and eventually settled his claim for 
the policy limits. He then made a demand for underinsured motorist benefits under his wife's 
insurance policy with Farmers. Farmers denied coverage, relying on the "regular use of another 
vehicle" exclusion. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff maintained that 
this exclusion did not apply because neither he nor a family member owned the vehicle he was 
driving when he was injured. Plaintiff argued that because the vehicle he was driving was 
furnished by the police department, it was not furnished for "regular use" by him or a family 
member. 
In addressing this issue, the Colorado Court of Appeals noted that "regular use" 
provisions generally allow coverage for the occasional infrequent use of a non-owned 
automobile, without requiring payment of additional premiums; distinguishing this from 
circumstances where automobiles are "regularly used" by a driver that is not listed under the 
policy and for which a premium is not paid. 
The Colorado Appellate Court reasoned that "such exclusions provide coverage for the 
occasional use of a vehicle not insured under the policy without incurring additional premium, 
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but exclude coverage for a vehicle that the insured or a family member uses on a regular basis 
without a corresponding premium charge." Id. 311. The court therefore held that because it was 
undisputed that the plaintiffs accident occurred while he was using a vehicle that was furnished 
or available for his regular use, summary judgment was appropriate. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Colorado court found that the phrase "furnished for regular use" was not ambiguous because 
"taken in its plain ordinary sense is easily understood to mean that no coverage exists on cars that 
he or his family may have the right to use regularly." 
\n Home Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 152 A.2d 115 (Del. Super. 1959), the court interpreted the 
same "regular use" exclusion. In that case, the defendant and injured party, Kennedy, was an 
employee of White Brothers Supply Company. This company furnished a pick-up truck to 
defendant for his exclusive use in connection with the business. He was also permitted to drive 
the truck to and from home and work. He had no authority to use it for personal or non-
occupational purposes. The truck was in his possession everyday and was used by him in the 
business at least 6 days a week. It was generally kept parked in front of his house. The truck had 
been in his continuous possession for approximately one year. Kennedy owned a Dodge 
automobile which he and his wife used. This automobile was insured by Home Insurance 
Company. 
On February 2,1957, while operating his business vehicle on a business trip, he was 
involved in an automobile accident. As a result of that, suit was filed against the tortfeasor and 
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his company for personal injury and wrongful death. The suit against the employer was settled. 
Kennedy then demanded that his own carrier take over the defense of the claims; his carrier 
refused to do so, citing the "regular use" exclusion. A declaratory judgment action was filed. 
"Defendant agrees that he would be excluded from coverage if the pick-up had been 
furnished for his regular use." Id. 111. However, he argued that this term meant a use that was 
"indiscriminate and unrestricted, full and complete use of the truck, and since his use of the truck 
was restricted to a 'business use', it was not furnished to him for its 'regular use.'" Id. 111. 
The court found that a private passenger automobile is covered as long it is "not furnished 
to the insured on a regular basis." Id. 118. The court found it was "immaterial whether or not 
the private passenger automobile, not regularly furnished, is used in the business or occupation of 
the insured." Id. 118. Thus, the court concluded that this vehicle was furnished to Kennedy by 
his employer for at least a year; that he had exclusive possession of the truck; that he used it 
every weekday for work; and that he also used it to go to and from his place of work, a distance 
of several miles daily, with the permission of the employer. On this basis, the court determined 
that: "[t]his arrangement was no casual, intermittent or infrequent use of the truck, but a steady, 
daily use of the vehicle. These facts show a 'regular use' by the defendant within the common 
meaning of the term." Id. 119. The court then concluded that the truck was furnished for his 
"regular use," so there was no coverage under the US AA policy. 
18 
Also, in Bringle v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., supra, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed 
the interpretation of the "regular use" exclusion. In this case, the injured party was employed as 
a carpet layer. This company owned five panel trucks which were regularly furnished to the 
carpet laying crew for hauling equipment to various jobs. While returning from an installation 
job, the plaintiff was involved in an accident while driving one of these vehicles. As a result, the 
plaintiff sustained injuries for which he sought medical payments. The plaintiff maintained that 
because he could only use the vehicle for business purposes and not for his personal use, it was 
not furnished for his "regular use." He requested the court interpret the exclusionary provision to 
mean that "before coverage may be denied, there must not only be a furnishing for the insured's 
regular use, but the vehicle thus furnished must also be regularly used by him." The trial court 
held that to sustain this contention would require "reading something into the policy that is not 
there." Id. 881. 
The court noted that plaintiff was employed by the carpet company that regularly 
furnished him a vehicle to go to and from installations. The frequency of such use would depend 
upon the number of installations. An important consideration was that the vehicle was furnished 
whenever there was an installation to be done. In determining that the "regular use" exclusion 
applied, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the plaintiff could use any one of five panel trucks 
for the carpet laying job he was assigned; that he would have frequent use of the panel trucks 
every time there were installations; that he had blanket permission to use these vehicles for 
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business purposes; that at the time he was using the vehicle for its intended business purpose; 
and that the vehicle was in the area that it was expected to be used. Id. 883. Thus, the court 
concluded that the vehicle was furnished for his "regular use." In reaching this decision, the 
court stated that it found the provision to be unambiguous. 
In addition, the court noted that: 
The general purpose and effect of this provision of the policy is to give 
coverage to the insured while engaged in the only infrequent or merely casual use 
of an automobile other than the one described in the policy, but not to cover him 
against personal liability with respect to his use of another automobile which he 
frequently uses or has the opportunity to do so. More specifically the evident 
intention of the limitation with respect to other automobiles is to prevent a 
situation in which the members of one family or household may have two or more 
automobiles actually or potentially used interchangeably but with only one 
particular automobile insured. Id. 882. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Ledoux v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 262 N.W.2d 418 
(Minn. 1978), upheld a "regular use" exclusion clause as well. In that case, the plaintiff, an 
employee of Worthington Daily Globe, was involved in a collision while driving his employer's 
vehicle in the course and scope of his employment delivering newspapers. Five days each week 
plaintiff went to his employer's place of business, picked up an automobile owned by the 
employer, and drove the vehicle to deliver newspapers to various locations. The employer's 
vehicle was not available to plaintiff for any purpose other than delivering newspapers and had 
never been used by him personally. The plaintiff was involved in an accident and sought 
coverage under his personal automobile policy. The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action 
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and then a summary judgment motion followed requesting interpretation of the "regular use" 
exclusion. 
Over the plaintiffs objection that the exclusion was ambiguous, the district court granted 
summary judgment, finding that the policy was not ambiguous and coverage was not provided 
because the employer's automobile was regularly and frequently used by the plaintiff and 
therefore was not a "non-owned" vehicle as defined by the policy. With respect to the plaintiffs 
claim the provision was not ambiguous. The court found that the words "furnished for regular 
use" and the definition of "non-owned automobile" should be given their "ordinary and common 
meaning." Id. All. The court was also of the opinion that "coverage must be restricted in order 
to prevent the insured from driving a number of additional vehicles and claiming coverage for all 
of them." Id. All. In this regard, the court pointed out that the plaintiff used his employer's 
automobile for 15 hours per week over a period exceeding over a year. "The inferences to be 
drawn reasonably from such facts lead to but one conclusion . . . as a matter of law that plaintiff 
was regularly using his employer's automobile" and, hence, the provision excluded coverage. Id. 
All. 
The Virginia Supreme Court, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 383 S.E.2d 734 
(Va. 1989), also upheld a "regular use" exclusion. In that case, Paul Jones was a salesman for 
Southern Vending Company. The company furnished him a 1978 Ford van which he used daily 
on his job. He was allowed personal use of the van if he got permission. He was involved in an 
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automobile accident on April 30, 1984 while making deliveries for the company. He sought 
coverage under Southern Vending's insurance policy, but claimed it was insufficient to pay his 
medical expenses so he then sought payment under his personal insurance policy issued by State 
Farm. That policy defined a non-owned automobile as "an automobile or trailer not owned by or 
furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative, other than a temporary 
substitute automobile." Id. 735. 
State Farm took the position that the van Jones was operating did not qualify for coverage 
because it was furnished for his regular use in the course of his employment. Accordingly, they 
refused to make medical payments. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial 
court determined the van was furnished to Jones for employment purposes, not for his personal 
use and, for this reason, the van was not "furnished for the regular use" of the insured, and Jones 
qualified for coverage. State Farm appealed, claiming that the vehicle had been furnished for his 
"regular use" and, therefore, it does not qualify as a "non-owned vehicle" and there would be no 
coverage. 
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that while Jones was required to obtain 
special permission to use the vehicle for personal purposes, he operated the van every day over a 
2-3 year period. He drove it over 300 miles a week and controlled the van an average of 6 days 
or 70 hours each week. For that reason, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was 
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reversed and State Farm's cross-motion for summary judgment was granted. In reversing the 
trial court, the Virginia Supreme Court held: 
An insurance company bases its policy and premium on its evaluation of the 
frequency and opportunity for risk to produce a loss. Driving a car is the risk 
covered in a personal automobile policy. The risk will obviously grow with an 
increase in driving frequency, regardless of the purpose of the tr ips. . . . Id. 736. 
The Texas Court of Appeals, in International Service Ins. Co. v. Walther, supra, also 
upheld the "regular use" exclusion. In Walther, the plaintiff was injured in a truck-train wreck. 
At that time, he was driving a truck owned by his employer, the Giddings Grain Company. As a 
result of the accident, his medical expenses were more than the limit of the medical payment 
benefits. He then sought coverage under his own policy. He referred to the definition of a "non-
owned" automobile as one "not owned by or furnished for regular use." Walther tried the case 
on the theory that his employer's truck was not furnished for his "regular use." The question 
then was whether as a matter of law the truck was furnished for the regular use of Walther. If it 
were, the insurance company had no liability. 
The court noted that the undisputed facts showed that Walther was employed by the grain 
company in 1962, and since July of 1965 was a feed delivery man. At the time of the accident, 
the grain company owned three delivery trucks. Walther drove all three trucks when making his 
deliveries. The size of the load determined the truck he selected. The trucks were garaged at the 
grain company and he was not permitted to use them for personal missions. He used the trucks 
23 
to make deliveries both around Giddings and out of town. The frequency of the trips depended 
upon the amount of feed sold during the week. Under these facts, the court determined that: 
The plan of medical payment coverage is to extend coverage to the insured while 
he is occupying an automobile other than the one named in the policy if the other 
automobile is not owned by him or furnished for his regular use. Such protection, 
then is given to casual or infrequent occupancy of other automobiles than the 
named automobile. It is regular double coverage that the 'regular use' clause 
avoids. Id. 775. 
The court also noted that the term "regular use" was not ambiguous, even though this 
issue was not raised. In this regard, the court noted that: 
The definition of 'non-owned automobile' not only excludes from coverage 
vehicles 'regularly used,' but also those 'furnished' for the insured's regular use. 
The words ' furnished for,' means to provide for, to supply, to afford, and to 
provide what is necessary for. . . . The words, 'regular use' mean a use steady or 
uniform in course, practice or occurrence, not subject to unexplained or irrational 
variation. Id. 776. 
The court found in favor of the plaintiffs insurance company, finding that the "furnished for 
regular use" provision applied to bar coverage. 
Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court in Kenney v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 
supra, also upheld a "regular use" exclusion, finding this provision to be unambiguous. Id. 221. 
From the above, it is clear that "regular use" does not necessarily mean both for business 
and personal use. Rather, its plain meaning suggests that the vehicle, for example, can be 
provided for "regular use" in the course and scope of employment. 
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B. Incidental Use Does Not Void the "Regular Use" Exclusion 
Other jurisdictions have held that an incidental use of a vehicle provided for business 
purposes does not void the "regular use" exclusion. The cases cited below represent examples 
where a vehicle was provided for business purposes and the individual deviated from that 
purpose, yet the courts upheld the "regular use" exclusion. 
For example, in Eddy v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., supra, the 
petitioners, Daniel and Darcy Eddy, sought coverage under the underinsured and personal injury 
protection provisions of their automobile policy. Their claims arose from an accident with an 
uninsured motorist who crossed the center line and collided with their vehicle. Petitioner Daniel 
Eddy had exclusive use of the company vehicle. At the time of the accident, he had been 
drinking, which was in violation of company policy. For this reason, he maintained that he did 
not have "regular use" of the automobile assigned to him. USF&G, the petitioners' insurer, 
denied payment of the claims, citing the "regular use" exclusion. Mr. Eddy did not dispute that 
the company vehicle was provided for his "regular use." However, he argued that because he had 
consumed alcohol while using the company car, this nullified the "regular use" provision. 
In response, the Washington Supreme Court referred to its opinion in Grange Ins. Ass 'n 
v. MacKenzie, supra, where it defined regular use as "[exclusive use, necessarily constitutes 
regular use, regardless of the purpose of that use... ," as distinguished from the type of use not 
excluded under the "other vehicle" exception as the "sporadic, isolated incidence of driving of a 
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noncovered car." Id. 969. Applying this definition, the court found that "regardless how limited 
his consumption of alcohol may have been when using the company station wagon, the vehicle 
was furnished or available for his regular use within contemplation of the statutory language 
permitting an exception to underinsured motorist coverage, and within the scope of the 
exclusionary language in USF&G's policy." Id. 969. Specifically, they held that "He used the 
vehicle every working day of his employment with AT&T until the accident. That Mr. Eddy 
chose, apparently on one occasion, to violate his employer's rule of conduct does not alter the 
conclusion that he was driving a vehicle provided for his regular use." Id. 969. See also 
Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Hargrove, 475 P.2d 912 (Wash. App. 1970); Abbott v. General 
Accident Group, supra; and Drollinger v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 797 P.2d 540 (Wash. App. 
Div. 3,1990) ("Regular use" exclusion is to prevent the purchase of insurance on one vehicle 
with the intent it provide coverage for any vehicle being driven, and also to ensure that the 
insurer's risk is not substantially increased without a corresponding increase in premium.) 
The Illinois Appellate Court, in Economy Fire and Cas. Co. v. Gorman, 406 N.E.2d 169 
(111. App. 4 Dist. 1980), decided similarly. In this case, defendant Gorman lived with his parents. 
At the time of the accident he was working for Mummert's delivering prescriptions for about 2 
months. His employer provided him a vehicle to be used for making the deliveries. His hours 
were 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, and 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Saturday. 
Many times during the week, he left at 8:00 p.m. to make deliveries and did not return until 8:30 
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or 8:45 p.m. He was told to return the car to the store when he finished making deliveries and, if 
no one was there, put the keys in the ashtray and lock the car. The car was never furnished to 
him for his personal use and he was never given permission to use the car after working hours. 
On the one occasion when he drove the car home instead of returning it to the store, the employer 
notified the police. 
On January 4,1978 he went to work as usual and made his deliveries. He left the store at 
8:30 p.m. with 7 or 8 deliveries to make. He was not sure of the location of the street of his last 
delivery, so he stopped at a friend's house between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m. Another friend who was 
at the house rode with Gorman to show him where the street was. When the two returned, 
Gorman's girlfriend and two other girls were there so he stayed for 30-45 minutes. Defendant 
Link then asked him to give her a ride home and she and another girl rode with him in his 
employer's car. He had taken one girl home, but Link was in the car with him when the collision 
occurred. 
Various arguments were advanced, but defendant relied upon his position that the 
transporting of these women was incidental and not for business purposes and, as such, at that 
time the vehicle was not furnished for his "regular use." In response to this argument, the court 
held: 
Here, the vehicle was furnished to Gorman, Jr. for his expected use throughout 
each business day for the purpose of making deliveries. Obviously, his use was 
not "incidental" and to have deemed his use of this vehicle to have been covered 
by his parents' liability policy would have greatly increased the exposure on that 
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policy without a compensating premium. We consider his use of the vehicle to 
have been "regular" as a matter of law. Id. 173. 
The above courts suggest that incidental side trips will not invalidate the "regular use" 
exclusion. 
C. Driving Other Than an Assigned Vehicle Does Not Invalidate the "Regular Use9' 
Exclusion 
Other jurisdictions have held that driving one or more of an employer's vehicles does not 
invalidate the "regular use" exclusion. In other words, as long as the vehicle being driven is 
furnished for business purposes, it does not matter if the assigned vehicle is the one being driven. 
In United Services Auto. Ass 'n v. Couch, 643 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), Mr. 
Couch was a "part-time" employee whose duties included helping around the kitchen, cleaning 
and delivering pizzas. A 1965 Chevrolet was available to him when he was working and when it 
was not being used by another employee. Couch was involved in an accident while driving this 
vehicle. He subsequently made a claim for benefits under his mother's USAA policy where he 
was an additional insured. In response, USAA filed a declaratory judgment action asking the 
court to interpret the "regular use" exclusion as precluding coverage. In looking at the "regular 
use" provision, the court determined that "the issue of regularity hinges not so much upon the 
regularity of the working time or the operator, but upon the regularity with which the vehicle was 
furnished or available." Id. 672. Under the facts of this case, there was no dispute but that the 
vehicle is regularly, i.e. constantly, available to the employees of the business, including Couch, 
when he was working and, for that reason, the court determined the vehicle was regularly 
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available to Couch within the meaning of the policy exclusion. In reaching its conclusion, the 
court determined that: 
The obvious purpose of the exclusion under discussion is to prevent abuse 
of the "non-owned" privilege by unnecessarily burdening the insurer with liability 
which ought to be covered by another insurance. For example, the exclusion 
excludes the insured from coverage on a second vehicle which he has not insured, 
or from coverage on a vehicle which insured has placed in the name of another in 
order to "borrow" it and use it without paying additional premium for the 
coverage. 
Also, the purpose of the exclusion is to deny coverage to the insured while 
using a vehicle as to coverage of which he has an opportunity to investigate. If a 
vehicle is not regularly available to insured and if insured uses a vehicle only on 
isolated occasions, it would not be expected that he inquire as to liability 
insurance on the vehicle. If, however, insured is available to him or uses a vehicle 
with any degree of regularity, it is expected that he would ascertain whether the 
vehicle is covered by liability insurance and, if not, would arrange for suitable 
protection for himself. Id. 672. 
Finally, the umit determined that the purpose of the exclusion was facilitated because of 
the regularity of the use by Couch and, therefore, the exclusion applied. 
See also O 'Brien v. Halifax Ins. Co. of Massachusetts, supra, involving a police vehicle 
in\ul I'd in .111 accident and a t Linn by the officer under his personal julonioltih policy. The 
court denied coverage, finding the police vehicle was furnished for his "regular use." Further, 
the court held that it does not matter whether the "insured's employer assigns him one specific 
automobile for regular use or a number of automobiles, any one of which may be assigned for a 
particular trip, the result is the same. An automobile is furnished to an insured 'for regular use' 
in either event. . . we agree . . . there is no ambiguity in (In; policy. . . ." Id. 308. 
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In Hall v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 670 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App. 1984), the 
plaintiff drove a truck for her employer, Allied Baggage Services. Two trucks were used in each 
route but they were actually assigned to an individual. One day when plaintiff was working 
overtime, she was assigned a truck which at the time was regularly assigned to another employee. 
She had never used the particular truck or trailer before. She was involved in an accident while 
driving this vehicle.. Southern Farm Bureau denied her claim, stating that the truck she was 
driving was not a covered vehicle. The policy covered certain "owned" and "non-owned" 
vehicles as defined in the policy. There was no dispute that the truck was not "owned" by Ms. 
Hall, but by her employer. Because it was non-owned and furnished for her regular use, coverage 
was excluded under the policy. The court noted that "the purpose of these provisions is to afford 
coverage for occasional use of other vehicles, but to exclude the habitual use of other cars, which 
would increase the insurer's risk without a corresponding increase in the premium." Id. 116-
111. As such, the insurer's motion for summary judgment was granted. 
In granting summary judgment, the court held: 
If an employee regularly drives a vehicle in his or her employment, and if the 
driving of such a motor vehicle constitutes the principal duty of the employment, 
and if a number of vehicles in a pool are available to that employee, subject to 
either a random assignment or assignment based upon the nature of the job 
involved, or a selection of the employee, then all vehicles in the pool are 
considered as a matter of law to be vehicles furnished for the employee's regular 
use. Id. 111. 
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Finally, driving other than the assigned vehicle will not invalidate the "regular use" 
exclusion. 
D Case Law Supports Farmers' Position that the "Regular Use" Exclusion Applies 
H ie above cases delineate the various situatioi is wl lere the ''''regular use" exclusion was 
applied to bar coverage. For example, there are cases which indicate that "regular use" does not 
mean that it has to include both business and personal use but, rather, that business use is 
sufficient. (See Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra; Home Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, supra; 
Bringle v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., supra; Ledoux v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., supra; State 
Farm Mut. Auto, In s. Co i Jones, supra; International Service Ins. Co, v. Walther, supra; and 
Kenney v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., supra) In addition, there were circumstances in 
which there were side trips made while the individual was driving the vehicle in the course and 
scope of his employment Ii i. this regard, these courts foi ind tl lat 'these side trips were ii icidental 
and did not void the "regular use" exclusion. (See Eddy v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. 
Underwriters, Inc., supra, and Economy Fire and Cas. Co. v. Gorman, supra.) Further, there 
were cases where there was more than one vehicle used at the place of employment; yet, the 
courts indicated that it did not invalidate the "regular use" exclusion if the individual was driving 
other than their assigned vehicle. (See United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Couch, supn i; O'Brien v. 
Halifax Ins. Co. of Mass, supra; and Hall v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., supra.) 
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The undisputed facts, coupled with Valentine's admission that the vehicle was furnished 
for her regular use, confirms that this exclusion applies to bar coverage. At the time of the 
accident, Valentine had been working for Frank Edwards for approximately two months and was 
driving a vehicle furnished for her "regular use" by her employer. She was delivering parts, 
which was one of the duties she performed in the course and scope of her employment. She 
regularly used that vehicle or, if it was not available, other vehicles also provided by her 
employer. She worked 5 days a week, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. At the time of the accident, 
she was delivering a part for her employer. As such, the "regular use" exclusion applies to bar 
coverage. It follows then that the trial court was correct in their determination that the phrase is 
not ambiguous and applies to bar UIM coverage for this loss. 
POINT III 
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOLLOWS THE VEHICLE, 
NOT THE INDIVIDUAL 
Valentine's arguments in the sections entitled "Utah's Motor Vehicle Insurance Code," 
"Component Parts of the Statutory Scheme," "Purpose and Policy," and "UIM Coverage Follows 
and Protects the Person" will be addressed under this heading. At issue in this case is whether 
Valentine is entitled to underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage. This issue turns on Utah's 
Compulsory Insurance Law (U.C.A. §§31A-22-302(c) and 31 A-22-305(9)(a)(ii)), whether the 
vehicle she was driving at the time of the accident was an insured vehicle under the policy, and 
also whether the "regular use" exclusion applies. 
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111IV1 coverage "is a facet of uninsured motorist coverage; its purpose to provide insurance 
protection to the insured against damages caused by a negligent motorist as if the motorist had 
another liability policy in the amount of the underinsured policy." USF&G v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 
519, $li i A' - :' average is not i i landatory, bi it allows const imers to opt oi it in 
writing. U.C.A. §§31A-22-305(9)(a)(ii) and 31A-22-302(c). As such, any exclusion to U M 
coverage does not violate public policy. State Farm Mut. Auto v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 101 (J Jtah 
2003). 
Valentine maintains that UIM coverage is "floating personal accident insurance" which 
does not attach to tl le vel iicle Foi tl lis reasoi I, she claims any restriction is void as against public 
policy. Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Missouri, 992 S.W.2d, 308, 313 
(Mo. App. 1999). In taking this position, Valentine fails to realize that the Utah Supreme Court, 
in Clark v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 122 7, 1229 (I Jtal I 1987),. determined tl lat 
UM coverage "was intended to rest with the vehicle and not with the named insured." Id. 1229. 
Clark involved a motor vehicle accident in which Clark, while driving a motorcycle, was 
killed by an uninsured motorist. At the time, the motorcycle Clark was driving was uninsured, 
but he had purchased insurance for his car from State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. Clark's 
family n lade a den land for i minsi ired motor ist benefits under the policy insuring this vehicle. 
This policy provided coverage if the vehicle involved in the accident was an "owned motor 
vehicle" as defined by the policy. An "owned motor vehicle" is "a vehicle described in the 
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declarations on the policy, temporary substitutes for those vehicles, and newly acquired 
vehicles." Since the motorcycle was not an "owned vehicle," "under the terms of the contract, 
the uninsured motorist clause did not apply to the motorcycle." Similarly, Valentine's policy and 
the Utah statute provide that UIM coverage only applies to an insured vehicle as described in the 
declarations. 
In response, the Clark family argued that U.C.A. §§31A-22-302 and 31A-22-305 (1986) 
"creates a personal right to uninsured motorist coverage and expresses a legislative statement of a 
public policy that forbids exceptions to uninsured motorist coverage." Id. 1228. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected this position, citing U.C.A. §41-12-21.1 (1981) (repealed and now 
codified in §§31A-22-302 and 31A-22-305), concluding that: 
We do not think that the statute, which merely requires insurers to offer uninsured 
motorist coverage and authorizes motorists to waive the coverage, evinces a 
legislative intent to allow an individual to purchase insurance on one vehicle and 
obtain coverage on all other vehicles in his household. . . . The legislative 
requirement that the coverage be offered on any motor vehicle in the state 
contradicts the Clarks' argument. If the legislature had intended to require 
uninsured motorist coverage only on one vehicle per household, it would have 
drafted the statute accordingly and would not have required the insurers offer the 
coverage on all vehicles. Id. 1229. 
Unlike Clark, who was driving an owned but uninsured vehicle, Valentine was driving a 
"non-owned" vehicle. Nevertheless, in both situations, neither vehicle was an insured vehicle 
because neither was described in the declarations of the policy. Also, in denying coverage, the 
Utah Supreme Court in Clark, citing the "opt out" provision, concluded: 
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• . . that the statutory provision allowing a motorist to waive uninsured motorist 
coverage also requires a rejection of the Clark family's position. The legislature, 
in drafting the statute in question, required that each insured be offered uninsured 
motorist coverage, but simultaneously allowed each named insured to reject the 
coverage. Thus, coverage was intended to rest with the vehicle and not with the 
named insured, since owners can opt in favor of uninsured motorist coverage on 
some vehicles and against it on others. Id. 1229,1230. (Emphasis added.) 
See also Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah App. 1989), wherein 
the court also determined (in referring to UM coverage) that "the legislative enactment is 
intended to rest coverage with the vehicle and not the named insured." Id. 1021. 
Also, none of the cases relied upon by Valentine support her position that UIM coverage 
is "floating persoi lal accident insurance." These cases have differei it statutes, policy language, 
and are factually distinguishable. In some cases, Valentine relied on statutes where UIM 
coverage is mandatory, unlike Utah's statute (U.C.A. §31A-22-305) where the insured can "opt 
oi it" of UIM coverage. These cases it lclude: State Farm Mut, Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duran, 785 P.2d 
570 (Ariz. 1989); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Martinson, 589 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1999); Veness v. 
Midland Risk Ins. Co., 732 N.E.2d 209 (Ind App. 2000) (in addition to having a statute making 
UIM coverage mandatory, the case did not involve a non-owned vehicle and dealt with a 
passenger on a motorcycle); Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. v. Gilbert, 791 P.2d 742 (Kan. App. 1990) (in 
addition to having a stati ite making UIM coveragemandatoi j it did not inv oh e anon owned 
vehicle); Dupin v. Adkins, 17 S.W.3d 538 (Ky. App. 2000); and Clark v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 577 N.W 2d ' 790 (Wise , 1998). 
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Other cases relied upon by Valentine are distinguishable because they do not involve a 
non-owned vehicle and also allow stacking (not allowed under Utah statute, U.C.A. §31A-22-
305(9)(e) or the Farmers' policy "other insurance" provision), selecting the highest limit, and 
alluding to the insured's "reasonable expectations" (not adopted in Utah, see Randle v. Allen, 862 
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993). These include: Jones v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 723 A.2d 390 (Del. 
Super. 1998); Squire v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 370 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (111. 1979) {Squire 
also adopted the reasonable expectation test); and Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country 
Ins. Co. of Missouri, supra (dealt with stacking and reasonable expectations). 
Finally, the following cases relied on by Valentine are factually distinguishable: Bass v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 196 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. App. 1973); Allstate v. Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d 
490 (Ha. 2000); and Pentz v. Davis, 927 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1996). Bass involved an owned vehicle 
not insured for UIM coverage and addressed whether UIM coverage could be obtained from 
another owned, insured vehicle. Kaneshiro concerned issues where UIM coverage was never 
offered. Finally, Pentz dealt with an issue of priority of payments among multiple vehicles for 
which there was UIM coverage. 
There is absolutely no support for Valentine's position that UIM coverage is "floating 
personal accident insurance." Rather, the Utah statute, the Farmers policy, and case law clearly 
provide that UIM coverage attaches to the vehicle, not the individual. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The case law relied upon by Farmers supports that the "regular use" exclusion K noi 
ambiguous and, when applied to the facts of this case, bars coverage for UIM benefits. Similarly, 
tl le stati itory and case law cited abo\ e clearly shows tl lat I. IIM coverage is not "floating personal 
liability coverage," but rather is dependent on the vehicle driven. Furthermore, such a position 
comports with public policy. For the above reasons, Farmers respectfully requests that the 
decision of the Trial Court granting summary judgment be affirmed. 
DATED this ^/^cfoy of August, 2005. 
4iU^ /s%J 
Barbara L. Maw 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-302 
Propriety of automobile insurer's policy of 
refusing insurance, or requiring advanced 
rates, because of age, sex, residence, or handi-
cap, 33 A.L.R.4th 523. 
State regulation of motor vehicle rental 
("you-drive") business, 60 AX.R.4th 784. 
Umbrella or catastrophe policy automobile 
liability coverage as affected by primary policy 
"other insurance" clause, 67 A.L.R.4th 14. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-302, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 183, § 1; 
1992, ch. 132, § 1; 2000, ch. 1, § 54; 2003, ch. 
76, § 1; 2003, ch. 218, § 1. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2000 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Sub-
ANALYSIS 
Construction. 
Insurance. 
Liability of county. 
Uninsured motorist coverage. 
—Exclusionary clause. 
Cited. 
Construction. 
Whether an insurance policy or combination 
of policies was "purchased to satisfy the owner's 
or operator's security requirement of § 41-12a-
301" hinges not on whether it actually satisfies 
the statutory security requirement, but ra ther 
whether it was purchased for the purpose of 
satisfying the statutory security requirement. 
What constitutes "motor vehicle" for pur-
poses of no-fault insurance, 73 AL.R.4th 1053. 
Application of automobile insurance "entitle-
ment" exclusion to family member, 25 A.L.R.5th 
60. 
Automobile insurance coverage for drive-by 
shootings and other incidents involving the 
intentional discharge of firearms from moving 
motor vehicles, 41 A.L.R.5th 91. 
section 31A-22-305(9)(c)" for "Subsection 31A-
22-305(8)(c)" in Subsection (l)(c). 
The 2003 amendments, both effective May 5, 
2003, substituted "Section 31A-22-305(9)" for 
"Section 31A-22-305(9)(c)" in Subsection (l)(c) 
and subdivided Subsection (3). 
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 2001UT 29, 
24 P.3d 928. 
Insurance. 
Where the insurance policy on the rental car 
was not a "policy of insurance or combination of 
policies purchased to satisfy the owner's or 
operator's security requirement of § 41-12a-
301," the coverage of tha t policy was governed 
by its own terms, and it was an "excess only" 
policy which expressly excluded coverage of the 
named insured's son. Arredondo v. Avis Rent A 
Car Sys., 2001 UT 29, 24 P.3d 928. 
Liability of county. 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own 
vehicles operated by permissive users, under 
31 A "-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle insur-
ance policies — Exceptions. 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall 
include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 and 
31A-22-304; 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless 
affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4); and 
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless 
affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(9). 
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, except 
for motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers, shall also include personal injury 
protection under Sections 31A-22-306 through 31A-22-309. 
(3) (a) First party medical coverages may be offered or included in policies 
issued to motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators. 
(b) Owners and operators of motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers are 
not covered by personal injury protection coverages in connection with 
injuries incurred while operating any of these vehicles. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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31A-22-303 INSURANCE CODE 
former law. See Foster v Salt Lake County, 712 Ins. Co , 743 P2d 1227 (Utah 1987). 
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985). A policy that covered the insured for any 
injury caused by an uninsured motorist, ex-
Uninsured motorist coverage, eluding therefrom only uninsured "automo-
—Exclusionary clause b l l e s " o w n e d by t h e insured, did not exclude 
Former § 41-12-21.1, which merely required uninsured motonst coverage when the msured 
, * j . I was operating a motorcycle. Bear River Mut. insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage
 T ^ TXT ° , , cr.-rrvr»aj mm/Tu u n*. A J ,, , . , , j? , Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct.App. 
and authorized motorists to waive coverage, did IQQQ) 
not require them to allow an individual to 
purchase insurance on one vehicle and obtain Cited m Neel v. State, 889 R2d 922 (Utah 
coverage on all the other vehicles in his house- 1995), Universal Underwriters Ins Co. v. State 
hold; a clause excluding such multiple coverage Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270 (Utah 
is permissible. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ct. App. 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44 
in Utah Law — Contract Law, 2001 Utah L. A.L.R.4th 1010. 
Rev. 1031. Validity, under insurance statutes, of cover-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile
 age exclusion for injury to or death of insured's 
Insurance § 22 et seq. f a ^ y
 o r household members, 52 A.L.R.4th 18. 
C . J . S . - 6 0 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 223.
 m a t c o n s t i tutes "entering" or "alighting 
AX.R. - Validity and construction of "no-
 from» v e h l d e withm m e a n i n g 0f i n sUrance pol-
fault automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d
 icy> o r s t a t u t e m a n d a t i n g insurance coverage, 
229 
Injury or death caused by assault as within 59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage. 
(1) (a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 and 
Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under 
Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a) shall: 
(i) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose name the 
policy was purchased, state that named insured's address, the cover-
age afforded, the premium charged, the policy period, and the limits of 
liability; 
(ii) (A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference 
all the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the 
person named in the policy, insure any other person using any 
named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of 
the named insured, and, except as provided in Subsection (7), 
insure any person included in Subsection (l)(a)(iii) against loss 
from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within 
the United States and Canada, subject to limits exclusive of 
interest and costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts not less 
than the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304; or 
(B) if it is an operator's policy, insure the person named as 
insured against loss from the liability imposed upon him by law 
for damages arising out of the insured's use of any motor vehicle 
not owned by him, within the same territorial limits and with the 
same limits of liability as in an owner's policy under Subsection 
(l)(ii)(A); 
(iii) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons related to 
the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who 
are residents of the named insured's household, including those who 
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Ch. 188 (S.B. 189) 
WEST'S NO. 2 85 
MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE POLICY COVERAGE 
AN ACT RELATING TO INSURANCE; AMENDING UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
COVERAGE PROVISIONS. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
31A-22-305, as last amended by Chapter 158, Laws of Utah 1999 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 31A-22-305 is amended to read: 
« UT ST § 31A-22-305 » 
31A-22-305. Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, including those 
who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or 
owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or operator 
of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or 
death of persons under Subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c). 
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(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(a)(i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered 
under a liability- policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or 
(ii)(A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required by Section 
31A-22-304; 
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the extent 
of the deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately caused 
by the vehicle operator; 
(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an accident is 
disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or, beginning with the 
effective date of this act, continues to be disputed for more than 60 days; or 
(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability insurer 
of the vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured only to the 
extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty 
association or fund. 
(3) « + ( a ) + » Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22- 302(1) (b) 
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death « - i n limits that at least equal the minimum bodily 
injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 31A-22-304-». 
« + ( b ) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of 
uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, 
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:+» 
« + ( i ) waives the higher coverage;+» 
« + ( i i ) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; a n d + » 
«+(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured 
motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's 
motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the? insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.+» 
« + ( c ) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less than 
the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under 
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Section 31A-22-304 .+» 
«+(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that issuer of 
the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests different 
uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer.+» 
«+(e)(i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 1, 
2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same 
medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of uninsured 
motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts 
up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy.+» 
«+(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured 
motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle 
liability policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.+» 
(4) (a) « + ( i ) + » Except as provided in Subsection (4) (b) , the named insured may 
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that 
provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a). 
«+(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that includes a 
reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage.+» 
«+(iii)+» This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage 
until the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that 
liability insurer. 
(b) « + ( i ) + » All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in 
the business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural persons by motor 
vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation services for their 
students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used for that purpose, by 
purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist 
coverage of at least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
« - (i) - » « + (ii) + » This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an 
injured covered person. 
«-(ii)->X<+(c)+>X<-This coverage does not apply to an employee, who is injured 
by an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy is-» « + Uninsured motorist 
coverage: + » 
«+(i) is secondary to the benefits+» provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' 
Compensation Act«- . - » « + ; + » 
«+(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;+» 
«+(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation 
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insurance; and+» 
«+(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered 
person has been made whole. + » 
« - (c) ->X<+ (d)+» As used in this Subsection (4): 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 63-30-2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la-102. 
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under 
Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered 
person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must show 
the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence 
consisting of more than the covered person's testimony. 
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the 
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. 
(b)(i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person as 
defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii). 
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is entitled to the 
highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that 
the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member. 
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the 
covered person is occupying. 
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the 
other. 
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be 
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections 
(1)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim 
is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle 
covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or 
(7), a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes 
uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage 
benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered 
person. 
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover uninsured motorist benefits 
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under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered person" as 
defined in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle; and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is 
not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, 
the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative. 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making subsequent 
elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
(8)(a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a vehicle, 
the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability policy at 
the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability 
coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same 
policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2). 
(9)(a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(c) provides 
coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from 
owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death «-in limits of at least $10,000 for one person in any 
one accident, and at least $20,000 for two or more persons in any one accident-». 
«+(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, 
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:+» 
«+(i) waives the higher coverage;+» 
«+(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and+» 
«+(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured 
motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's 
motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage 
limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.+» 
«+(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less 
than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000 for two or 
more persons in any one accident. + » 
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«+(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that issuer of 
the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests 
different underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer.+» 
«-(b)->X<+(e)+» The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as 
described in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner 
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). 
Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability coverage 
of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, 
combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of 
the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the 
injured person. 
«-(c)->X<+(f)+» (i) «-For new policies or contracts written after January 1, 
1993, a-» «+A-f» named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an 
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(1) (a) . 
«+(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that 
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage 
and when it wouLd be applicable. + » 
«+(iii)+» This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage 
until the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that 
liability insurer. 
« - (ii) ->X<+ (g) + » In conjunction with the first « - three-» « + t w o + » renewal 
notices sent after January 1, « - 1993-» «+2001+», for policies existing on 
that date, the insurer shall «-notify the insured of the availability of 
underinsured motorist coverage along with estimated ranges of premiums for the 
coverage. The department shall provide standard language to be used by insurers 
to fulfill the insurers' duty under this Subsection (9).-» «+disclose in the 
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the 
coverage in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.+» 
«+(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry underinsured 
motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle 
liability policy limits or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.+» 
(10)(a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily 
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor 
vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a 
resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is 
described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a 
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. 
Except as provided in «+this+» Subsection (10) , a covered person injured in a 
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vehicle described in a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not 
elect to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor 
vehicle insurance policy under which he is a named insured. 
(b)(i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the 
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. 
(ii) Subsection (10)(b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered person as 
defined under Subsection (10)(c)(i)(B). 
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be 
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections 
(1)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage. 
«+(c) Underinsured motorist coverage :+» 
«+(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' 
Compensation Act;+» 
«+(ii) may not be subrograted by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;+» 
«+(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation 
insurance; and+» 
«+(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered 
person has been made whole.+» 
« - (c) ->X<+ (d) + » (i) Each of the following persons may also recover 
underinsured motorist coverage benefits under any other policy in which they are 
described as a "covered person" as defined under Subsection (1): 
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an underinsured motor vehicle; or 
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not 
owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, the 
covered person's resident spouse, or th£ covered person's resident relative. 
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a secondary source of coverage. 
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)«- (c) - > X < + (b)+»(i) (B) 
is entitled to the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for 
any one vehicle that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family 
member. 
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the 
covered person is occupying. 
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the 
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other. 
« - (d) ->X<+ (e) + » A covered injured person is not barred against making 
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections. 
«+(ll) A claim may not be brought by a covered person against a motor vehicle 
underinsured motorist policy more than three years after the date of the last 
liability policy payment. + » 
Approved March 13, 2000 
Effective May 1, 2000. 
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